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Abstract
A new compact and homogeneous symbolism is introduced to achieve a more general and exact
representation of natural language texts. Traditional first-order and intensional logic cannot cope
with numerous natural language phenomena such as the large variety of modalities, satisfactory
interpretation of iterative application of modal operators or certain modelling problems like one-
to-one sentence–formula mapping. The CTRL/iCTRL formalism can model them successfully and
they are able to control many other different shades of meaning by applying only a minimal number
of syntactic tools.
The most profitable and beneficial AI application of the presented natural language syntax
consistent knowledge representation technique is automated knowledge acquisition: computer-
aided textual data base generation and logical inference based information retrieval. CTRL/iCTRL
applicability is demonstrated by various illustrative examples including a transparent graphical
interpretation analogous to Frege’s graph language that help clarify new concepts and exemplify
partial inappropriateness of traditional logical language.
The CTRL/iCTRL paradigm is based on a novel and interesting synthesis of the two traditional
logic schools, the Stoic and the Peripatetic school, refuting a century long scientific prejudice against
the latter stated to be completely outworn. An interesting issue of this analysis points out that
expressing subordination unconsciously and simply by co-ordination causes a typical restriction of
meaning in classical logic. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A new logical language, CTRL, recalling Aristotelian term logic has been introduced
formerly by the author [12]. The aim of this essay is to extend it to the intensional level,
iCTRL, which faithfully and consistently formalises the classical Carnapian concept of
intension also reconstructing Kripke semantics in order to arrive at a better expressive
power. 2 This latter characteristic of iCTRL implies a powerful logical type of knowledge
representation method enabling text based information retrieval system applications, on the
other hand it is also promising in modelling several particular natural language phenomena.
A detailed demonstrative analysis of classical S4 axioms, and the converse of the Barcan
formula illustrates some of these capabilities of the new representation language revealing
blind spots of the traditional intensional language of logic, which hinder it from accessing
to certain distinctions and certain shades of meaning.
Additional conclusions are reached by clarifying and comparing the historical back-
grounds of the competing formal structures of the conventional (Stoic school related) and
text representational (continuing the Peripatetic line of tradition) language of logic that ex-
plain the causes of the differences in their expressive capacities. The presented arguments
justify the fact that the Peripatetic approach to logic has unfairly been neglected since the
end of last century.
The paper itself is confined to the indicated subject supposing the reader to be familiar
with CTRL. Nevertheless, most of the subsequent sections on Orientation together with
Section 3, that is a complete description of the new formalism imported from [12], offer a
sufficient overview of ordinary CTRL, its basic concepts, techniques and results necessary
to get to further conclusions. Appendix A, however, is a technical supplement to the proofs
of Section 5 summarising definitions, theorems and their proofs essential to come to a
correct adaptation of resolution to iCTRL, the most commonly known inference algorithm
of theorem-proving systems.
2. Orientation
2.1. CTRL concepts—a retrospection
2.1.1. Motivation
The ordinary conformal text representation technique has been developed with almost
fully pragmatic deliberations to achieve a suitably accurate textual knowledge represen-
tation method that allows logical type of information retrieval. Accuracy is particularly
accented here and it is meant in both syntactic and semantic sense. A traditional logic
based text analysis and representation method could result in a routine and correct solu-
tion with maximal accuracy concerning semantics, but not in the respect of syntax. The
traditional language of logic generally needs a necessary preparation phase, i.e., a truth-
value-invariant mapping of natural language statements, usually implying drastic changes
2 The qualitative terms of expressive power, capacity, capability or expressiveness all refer here to the attribute
of a formal language relative to a corresponding natural one indicating how much of the latter can be emulated
by that formal language.
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in syntactic structures, before converting them to the corresponding first-order formulae.
Therefore, as the latter results reflect the syntactic structures of the original statements
in a relatively poor manner, this can make the essential validation tests, mapping fidelity
tests, i.e., contrasting the source text with its formalised version, actually unrealisable on
a large scale application. Text representation was designed to eliminate these problems by
transforming natural language statements to formulae, which can be constructed solely on
the basis of their elementary grammatical analysis relying on the principle that syntactic
structures of natural languages should totally involve logical ones.
Traditional logic distinguishes logical rough structure of statements from that of logical
fine structure according to the level of representation applying the tools of propositional
and predicate logic, respectively. Keeping this terminology but not the decomposition
principle unchanged, the main difference when comparing the devices of traditional
logic to the method in question is that using propositional connectives for interpreting a
subordinate type of relations is regarded as unfavourable for encoding logical fine structure.
Example 2.1. According to the routine representation technique the sentence “Horses are
animals.” needs to be rephrased first like “For anything, if it is a horse, then it is an animal.”
from which finally the following classical first-order formula can be obtained:
∀x.is-horse x ⊃ is-animal x.
This rephrasing stage itself and hence the import of the connective “⊃” is objectionable
here, as the natural language statement does not use any co-ordinate (propositional)
connective in this context either. A somewhat different problem is that actually there exists
a rewriting of this statement which really uses the criticised conditional, and which is
usually accepted as (but formally never proven to be) its truth value equivalent.
A rather much natural grammatical principle is regarded adequate instead. Pais referring
to Paul builds the natural grammatical syntax on one single relation: the generalised
subject–predicate relation [9]: 3
“The ground of the most ancient logical relation, or rather of any logical relation,
is that a concept is compared to other ones, and as a consequence of this it is
unified with certain ones and distinguished from others. This is the so-called subject-
predicate: predicative relation, that is the most original structure in grammar carrying
that kind of relationship that has a dominant role in the dynamics which makes a
sentence to be a sentence. It is the utterance of a name of a concept after or before
another one to express that one of them is similar to the other, moreover, according
to certain other ways of comprehension, it is identical to that. . . .”
“Several other relations have grown out from the subject-predicate, i.e., predicative
relation: attributive, determinative (adverbial), objective relations, in such a way
that the attributive, determinative and objective structures are power lost subject-
predicate: predicative structures. . . .”
3 The following extracts are translated from Hungarian by the author.
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“We try to make an effort to clarify the development process of grammatical
relation categories subsequently. . . . Paul’s fundamental idea will be accepted to set
out from, according to which any syntactical relations: complement forming, other
than copulative conjunction: co-ordination, are derivable from the subject-predicate
relation in such a way that the relation of subject and predicate is applied repeatedly.
The following development possibilities can be pointed out.
Sentences can be constructed such as water warm, flow—one subject, two
predicates. One of the two predicates, warm, has lost its predicative, being-in-
relation-to-the-reality accent, and joined to the subject so as to create, instead of
a predicative relation, which is essential in the sentence forming dynamics, another
type of that, i.e., an attributive one. But warm could lose its predicative power by
joining to the other predicate, flow, as becoming to its adverb, determiner, with the
meaning ‘warmly flows’. Predicates of certain character have drawn other predicative
power lost predicates to themselves as objects, i.e., ‘flow warm’, 4 in such a way that
‘flow’, that has a similar meaning to ‘run’, changed its meaning to ‘make something
flow’ or ‘make something run’. . . .”
According to the ideas outlined above the following principles can be settled:
– there exists a grammatical model of the natural language sentence structure describing
the non-co-ordinate relations among its constituents as predicative, objective, deter-
minative, attributive etc. ones, and
– grammatical constituents corresponding to these relation types are not distinct in
logical sense: the roles of these constituents can be interchanged (what was object can
be a subject later etc.), hence all other differences can be neglected, in other words the
functional sentence model can be based on one single generalised subject-predicate
relation.
The (generalised) predicative relation can easily be recognised in the previous example
by identifying “(any) horses” as the subject and “are animals” as the predicate. Another
subject-predicate (determinative in the strict grammatical sense) relational decomposition
could be, of course, continued with the subject.
Two elementary components, predicates in traditional terms, of the set
“horse x”, “∀x”, “animal x”
are joined in predicative relation forming the formula subject: (∀x)(horse x), which
group forms again a predicative relation with “animal x”, the formula/sentence predicate,
resulting in the formula which can be represented as follows:
(animal x)[(∀x)(horse x)],
where x denotes a variable parameter referring to the objects of the given context and
(· · . . .) denotes uniformly the predicative relation. Punctuation by spaces and commas may
be preferred to brackets:
animal x(∀x,horse x),
4 The Hungarian original equivalent to flow is intransitive, too.
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Fig. 1. Graphical representation of sentence: “Horses are animals.”
which can be shortened, keeping the right-to-left priority convention, to:
animal x,∀x,horse x.
The above CTRL formula of list form can intuitively be visualised by the graph in Fig. 1.
As comparing this one to the first-order formula above it is obvious that only the
same main components are permuted, although their grounds are totally different. At this
stage an apparent advantage of the graphical representation technique is also conspicuous:
orthogonal branches represent the two main independent dimensions (elementary relations
of the syntax).
Coming to the end of the informal introduction some new terms are to be initiated next
to promote to a formal description.
2.1.2. Elementary relations of text representation
Conceptual relation plays the same role as the concept of predicate in traditional logic
(in order to distinguish it clearly from the predicative relation introduced and discussed
above, this new term is preferred). Conceptual relation is an ordered list of symbols set up
by the name of the concept heading the list, and continued by a parameter list indexing
the potential complements or subordinates of the concept. The so-called variable symbols
following the concept name in the list identify the grammatical roles of the complements
by their position characterising the conceptual relation: e.g., “horse x” (x is-a-horse),
“has x y” (x has y).
Predicative relation, sentence-forming relation. Conceptual relations, which are the
word-like elements of the language, can construct compound expressions (predicates,
subjects, clauses, and sentences) making use of the predicative relation that may be
applied iteratively. Two (or more, by using right-to-left priority convention of bracketing)
conceptual relations form a predicative one, provided that there is a group of objects
commonly referred to by them: they have a common variable parameter. The head element
of the list of conceptual relations can be regarded as the “modifier section” of the rest, i.e.,
the group of objects referred to by the tail of the list, acting as the “modified section”.
Example 2.2.
• “high x , horse x”—x is-high, where x is-a-horse≡ x is-a-high-horse—form together
a potential compound predicate (the modifier-modified pairs of phrases are enhanced).
• “∀x, high x,horse x”—any-of x , where x is-high, and where x is-a-horse ≡ x any-
of-high-horses—form together a potential subject.
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• “animal x , ∀x,high x,horse x .”—x is-animal, where x is-any-high-horse ≡ x any-
high-horse, x is-animal—is a sentence.
Contraction variable is a device for cross-sentential and cross-clausal anaphor resolution
(also discussed in [3]). This problem does not seem to be crucial, however, to achieve
a more natural decomposition of natural language sentences/clauses seems to be an
acceptable motivation.
Example 2.3. Consider the following sequence of sentences: “Pedro has a donkey. He
beats it.” Traditionally, this two separate sentences cannot be represented by separate first-
order formulae. Personal pronouns, “he” and “it”, of the second one are expected to be
interpreted first as referring to the terms “Pedro” and “a donkey”, respectively, and then
the two sentences are represented by one single formula.
What one would like to have instead is a representation of the separate sentences
individually also utilising the above interpretation. The formula representing the first
sentence is clearly:
(has x y,∃y,donkey y)Pedro x.
Subsequently, it is supposed implicitly that the subject and the object are known and can
be referred to:
(beat u v,∀v→ y)∀u→ x.
Here v→ y and u→ x are called contraction variable occurrences of x and y in ∀v→ y
and ∀u→ x , respectively, indicating that the quantification of the subject and the object
are predefined as shown earlier. The descriptive part of the subject and the object should
be determined by the referred sentence omitting the superfluous internal quantification.
An execution of the prescribed substitutions on the second formula yields the following
equivalent rephrasing
[beat u v,∀v, (has x v,donkey v),Pedro x]Pedro u.≡
(beat u v,∀v,has u v,donkey v)Pedro u.
The above formulae can also be illustrated (see Fig. 2).
2.2. iCTRL—an intensional extension of CTRL
2.2.1. Motivation
One of the commonly used intensional functors is necessity, N , causing interpretation
problems even in the case appearing to be one of the most simple ones. It is not easy to find
an equally simple dual formula for de re application ofN like the one valid for the de dicto
mode: N(p a). This kind of ambiguity of de re mode, studied earlier by Stalnaker and
Thomason [17], can be eliminated either by using the correct but relatively complicated
Churchian λ-conversion technique: [λx.N(p x)]a, or by simply paraphrasing as in [14]:
∃x[x = a&N(p x)].
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Fig. 2. Use of contraction variable and its decomposition.
A similarly equivocal, but even more confusing example demonstrating occasional
ambiguity of the language of classical modal logic can be presented by the S4 scheme.
Which of the readings of NNp should be taken correct: N(N(p)) or (N(N))p or none
of them, but some other one that may be inexpressible in the classical language? These
problems seem to be left out of reach for classical analysis motivating revision.
The succeeding analysis will consider choices of intensional extension of text represen-
tation language, leading also to a more exact reformulation and more convincing answer
to the open problems summarised above.
2.2.2. Extension, intension, context and related problems
The widely known key concepts of intensional logic (contrasted with extensional
one, which is associated with extension) are intension (meaning) and context (situation,
alternative/possible worlds). It is a cliché yet a common sense understanding that any
logical analysis of a natural language sentence, including the intention of its logical
representation by reformulating it into a (or rather into a few) corresponding logical
statement(s), needs to know the circumstances of its utterance, i.e., the context. In other
words, the logical structure of a statement is impossible to be thoroughly described without
having enough knowledge about the current denotation (extension) of the occurring
designators, but at the same time information about their usage (context, meaning) may
also be crucial. These latter type of relations characterise intensional logic compared to
extensional one [14], the historical milestones of which are represented by the names of
Frege (1892), Carnap (1947) and Kripke (1959, 1963), parallel with them Prior (1957) and
Montague (1970) subsequently.
According to Carnap’s generally accepted terminology the meaning (intension) of any
designator is a function, which orders its current extension relative to a situation/possible
world. Approaching from the representational point of view the first problem faced is how
to represent meaning as an object. As it is most commonly presented due to Montague,
the intension of any designating expression, p, can be denominated, viz. it is the function,
denoted by pˆ, attaching an extension to p relative to an object domain for any elements
of an index domain labelling situations, respectively. Hence, intensional functors operate
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on the intension of their arguments. Special stress is on the fact that intension, taken to be
a function, is referred to not by its value or argument, but by the function itself, while an
intensional functor is applied on it.
Beyond other difficulties it is not easy to accept this principle. It was discussed
previously with reference to modelling natural language sentence structure and Pais’
fundamental principles [9] that every statement, including intensional ones, too, have a
structure which can be represented by simple or iterated subject-predicate relations, where
the terms subject and predicate are meant in a generalised sense. Assuming this, intension
can play the role of a subject with difficulties.
Example 2.4. It is hardly conceivable that the predicate: “Julia looks for”, is to be applied
on the intension of its object: “a man”, in the classical example: “Julia looks for a man”. It
is usually commented, as Julia may not find anybody, because she can be so pretentious that
the very man she is looking for may not even exist, but in spite of this fact the statement
itself can still be true. So it is often argued that the predicate “Julia looks for”, possibly
not being able to refer to any real man, is not applied to its object, “a man”, but to the
meaning of it, namely to a function. Against this reasoning the counter argument can be
posed that Julia is apparently supposed to have no doubt about the meaning according to
she is looking for “a man”, even if the phrase: “a man”, as projected to the present world,
may have an empty extension.
A more favourable base for a more exact solution seems to be the observation that the
present world and Julia’s imaginary world containing also that very person she is looking
for may not be identical. But if such person really exists in Julia’s imagination, then that
extension should be referred to by her search, and so the above sentence can be true in spite
of the fact that those people in the present real world may never be found.
The above arguments point out that keeping the commonly used original concept of
meaning, a modified way of representing intension may be more preferable for the specified
purposes, which makes every component explicit.
The Montaguevian way of notation itself is based on the same Carnapian definition of
meaning. According to that it is a function attaching the current extension to any designator
in any situation. The meaning of p is denoted by pˆ obeying to the classical function symbol
conventions: pˆ denotes the value of the function, ,ˆ at p. So pˆ may be interpreted as the
current extension of p in a situation unidentified so far, as it is argued for, or as the function
itself, just as it is intended to by the traditional notion.
These ideas can fully be realised by the syntax of conformal text representation:
[α]x. (1)
Provided that α denotes an arbitrary formula and x a contextual variable parameter, [α]x
designates the function mapping any index of the context domain referred to by x to the
current extension of α. In this notation there appears every constituent of the scenario,
namely: x , the contextual variable parameter referring to any situation of the domain, [α],
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Fig. 3. Graphical representation of the sentence: “Julia looks for a man”.
labelling the function itself, and the image of the function which is either referred by the
unbound variable(s) occurring in α, or by its truth value.
Example 2.4 (Continued). Returning to the previous example the following efforts can be
made for a better representation of the original content.[{([look-for x y]z, [Julia x]w)[∃y,man y]z}[J z]w]0w.
This formula expresses that:
(a) Beside the present world, indexed by “0w”, there exists Julia’s one, “J z”, also
playing the role of an alternative to the present world, referred to by the expression
“[J z]w, 0w” (with the intended literal meaning: “a world, denoted by the function
[J z]w, the current image world of which is ordered to the world indexed by 0w
acting as its alternative”, i.e., the current extension of the world “J z” depends on
the current reference of the present world “0 w”).
(b) In Julia’s world there are some men who are stated to be looked for by Julia (the
extension of the individual [Julia x]w should of course belong to the present world,
although the relations [look-for x y]z and [man y]z have both their references from
Julia’s world).
(c) Hence, Julia’s search is implicitly hypothesised to be embedded into a wider world
than the present one also comprising the men who may not exist in reality but
extending her search on them, according to intuition, the sentence in focus can after
all be evaluated true.
According to the graphic language presented previously the formula above can be
visualised by the graph in Fig. 3.
3. The CTRL/iCTRL formalism
A formal language reconstructing the previously outlined grammatical relations is
described in the subsequent sections.
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3.1. CTRL syntax and semantics
3.1.1. Syntax
Alphabet. Let T be a set of symbols (parameters) the elements of which are categorised
as follows: variable (also contraction/reference variable) symbols denoted by lower cases
indexed if necessary, n-ary conceptual relation symbols denoted also by lower cases,
names and function symbols denoted by upper cases. “∀” and “∃” are regarded as special
unary conceptual relation parameters referring to universal and existential quantifiers,
respectively. “∼” indicates the logical constant of negation. “ ” (space) and “,” are used
as the connectives of conceptual and predicative relations, “.”, “(“ and ”)” as punctuation
symbols, respectively.
Rules of formula construction. If p is an n-ary conceptual relation parameter and x1, . . . , xn
are variable symbols then the conceptual relation
p x1 . . . xn
is an atomic formula. Names formed by a name parameter, P , and a variable symbol, x ,
P x
are taken as singular conceptual relations. Similarly, provided that F is an n-ary (n> 1)
function symbol with x1, . . . , xn as domain and y as image variable symbols, the function
(F y)x1 . . . xn
is also termed as a singular conceptual relation with respect to the variable symbol y while
for domain variables x1, . . . , xn it is still treated as any other atomic formula.
If α is atomic, then it is also a formula. Provided that α is a formula and α(x), β(x)
denote arbitrary formulae containing neither quantifier nor singular conceptual relations
with respect to the variable symbol x , so are formulae
∼α,
α(x), β(x).
Expressions like
∃x, α(x),
∀x, α(x)
including singular atomic formulae are called subjects. If σ(x) denotes a subject and α(x)
a non-subject, i.e., predicate type of formula regarding the variable symbol x , then
α(x), σ (x).
is also a formula.
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This language can be extended by a special type of variable, the so-called reference or
contraction variable denoted by “x→ y” (see [10–12]). If σ(y) denotes a subject, then
α(x), ∀x→ y
α(x), ∃x→ y
are also formulae.
No other type of formula exists.
The concept of free/bound variable appeared in the preceding paragraphs implicitly. An
occurrence of a variable symbol, x , in α(x) is said to be free, if there is no subject binding
x in α(x), the variable occurrence is bound otherwise. A formula with no free variable
occurrences is closed, open otherwise.
Before proceeding with semantics, an example may help to become more familiar with
formula construction and discussing variable scopes.
Example 3.1. Verify that the expression “a x(b x,∀x, c x)” is a formula and if it really is,
which are its subformulae.
According to the construction rules above the following formula decomposition can be
realised “a x(b x[∀x, c x])” showing clearly that variable x of “a x” cannot refer to the
same object as the one in the subformula “b x,∀x, c x”, since x is already bound in it, i.e.,
variable x of “a x” and that of “b x,∀x, c x” can actually refer just to different objects.
Therefore it would be clearer to choose two distinct variable parameters in this case, e.g.,
“a y(b x,∀x, c x)”. Consequently, the scope of a variable symbol is at most that closed
subformula which includes it. 5
This situation changes radically if parentheses were neglected: “a x,b x,∀x, c x”. This
expression cannot be interpreted as a formula, unless it is made unambiguous by suitable
parentheses, either just as above or possibly as: “(a x, b x)∀x, c x”.
3.1.2. Semantics
Turning to the semantics, which is always the question of central interest, first an
interpretation is built up to assign meaning to any conceptual relational parameters.
Interpretation. Let U be a given non-empty set that is the object universe. Then an
extension is joined to each n-ary conceptual relation parameter, p ∈ T (n = 1,2, . . .), as
its reference:
r(p x1 . . . xn)⊆Un.
In case of names, P ∈ T :
r(P x)⊆U.
(Reasonably, r(P x) consists of one single element.) If F is an n-ary function parameter
of T (n> 1) then
5 From outside of this subformula only a reference variable is able to access to a variable of this type (see also
footnote 11 and [11]).
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r
(
(F y)x1 . . . xn
)= {(η, ξ1, . . . , ξn): (ξ1, . . . , ξn) ∈Un,
η= F(ξ1, . . . , ξn) ∈U, F :Un→U
}
.
With reference to quantifiers, “∀” and “∃”, their meanings are fixed as:
r(∀x)=U,
r(∃x) ∈ 2U \ {∅}. 6
Formula evaluation. The evaluation of open formulae based on a certain interpretation
comes next at issue. Let α be atomic, α(x, y) and β(y, z) be arbitrary formulae, where x
and z may represent lists of variables: x = x1, . . . , xn; z= z1, . . . , zm; and let (P y)z be a
singular conceptual relation with respect to y .
The extension of ∼α is defined as:
r(∼α)=Un \ r(α).
The extension of a predicative relation formed by the formulae α(x, y) and β(y, z) is:
r
(
α(x, y),β(y, z)
)= {(ξ, η, ζ ): (ξ, η) ∈ r(α(x, y)), (η, ζ ) ∈ r(β(y, z))},
r
(∼(α(x, y),β(y, z)))= {(ξ, η, ζ ): (ξ, η) ∈ r(∼α(x, y)), or
(η, ζ ) ∈ r(∼β(y, z))}.
The evaluation of closed formulae expects that references attached to “∀y , β(y, z)” and
“∃y , β(y, z)” types of expressions, i.e., quantified subjects, are already at hand:
r
(∀y,β(y, z))= {(η, ζ ): (η, ζ ) ∈ r(β(y, z)), η ∈ r(∀y)},
r
(∃y,β(y, z))= {(η, ζ ): (η, ζ ) ∈ r(β(y, z)), η ∈ r(∃y)}.
Then for closed formulae: “α(x, y), (P y)z” (z may be missing: names can be treated as
0-ary functions), “α(x, y), ∀y , β(y, z)” and “α(x, y), ∃y , β(y, z)” with respect to the
variable y:
r
(
α(x, y), (P y)z
)=

{
(ξ, η, ζ ): (ξ, η) ∈ r(α(x, y)), (η, ζ ) ∈ r((P y)z),
r
(
(P y)z
)⊆y r(α(x, y))},7
nil otherwise,
r
(
α(x, y),∀y,β(y, z))=

{
(ξ, η, ς): (ξ, η) ∈ r(α(x, y)), (η, ς) ∈ r(∀y,β(y, z)),
r
(∀y,β(y, z))⊆y r(α(x, y))},
nil otherwise,
6 It should be reminded that in this construction the reference of “∃x” is not unique.
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r
(
α(x, y),∃y,β(y, z))=

{
(ξ, η, ς): (ξ, η) ∈ r(α(x, y)), (η, ς) ∈ r(∃y,β(y, z)),
r
(∃y,β(y, z))⊆y r(α(x, y))},
nil otherwise.
It is to be observed that r[α(x, y),∀y,β(y, z)] 6= nil may occur even if r[β(y, z)]y = ∅,
since r[∀y,β(y, z)]y = ∅ ⊆y r[α(x, y)]. The same holds for names without reference,
r[α(x, y), (P y)z] = nil only if r[(P y)z]y is really out of r[α(x, y)]y .
For negations of formulae let the following hold:
r
(∼(α(x), (P x)z))= r(∼α(x), (P x)z),
r
(∼(α(x),∀x,β(x)))= r(∼α(x),∃x,β(x)),
r
(∼(α(x),∃x,β(x)))= r(∼α(x),∀x,β(x)).
As to formulae containing contraction variables, the referred subject gets its reference
from that open subformula which is marked by the variable following “→” in the
contraction variable symbol. Let α(x→ y)= α′(x), Qx→ y denote a formula containing
the “x → y” contraction variable with Q as quantifier symbol and “pi(y),σ (y)” the
referred subformula of the considered text. Apparently, y is treated as a global variable.
Then the reference of the associated subject containing the contraction variable can be
determined as r(α(x → y)) = r(α′(x),Qx → y) = r(α′(x),Qx,σ ′(x)) where σ ′(x) is
meant as follows:
σ ′(x)=
{
β(x), γ (x) if pi(y),σ (y)= β(y),∀y,γ (y) or β(y),∃y,γ (y),
(A x)z,α(z) if pi(y),σ (y)= [pi(y), (A y)z]α(z).
Self-reference, i.e., a contraction referring to the same subformula in which it is
contained can be ignored.
Finally, for any double negated formula:
r(∼∼α)= r(α).
The truth-value evaluation process of any closed formula, α, can be reduced to checking
the non-emptiness of its extension:
|α| =
{
true if there exist r(α) 6= nil,
false otherwise.
Some unusual features of the evaluation process may be worth mentioning. According
to the definition both open and closed types of formulae can have an associated extension
which is not like the case in classical logic. Furthermore, formulae with the same truth
values can often be evaluated with different references (e.g.: |a x,∀x,b x| = |∼(∼a x,
7 α(. . . , x, . . .) ⊆x β(. . . , x, . . .) abbreviates the relation α(. . . , x, . . .)x = {ξ : (. . . , ξ, . . .) ∈ α(. . . , ξ, . . .)} ⊆
{η: (. . . , η, . . .) ∈ β(. . . , x, . . .)} = β(. . . , x, . . .)x . On the other hand, nil denotes formally the same as ∅, i.e., the
empty set, with the same properties, except that it is reserved only for identifying the case when the inclusion
stipulation does not hold.
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b x)∀x|, although r(a x,∀x,b x) 6= r[∼(∼a x,b x)∀x)]). A generalisation of this fact is
frequently referred to as the contraposition rule.
Proposition 3.1 (Contraposition rule). If pi(x, y), σ (x, z), “pi(x, y), ∀x, σ(x, z)” and
“∼[∼pi(x, y), σ (x, z)]∀x”
are formulae, then
“pi(x, y),∀x,σ(x, z)” and “∼[∼pi(x, y), σ (x, z)]∀x”
are logically equivalent in the sense that they have simultaneously nil or non-nil reference
in any context, respectively.
Proof. Obviously, r(pi(x, y), ∀x , σ(x, z)) 6= r(∼[∼pi(x, y), σ (x, z)]∀x) although r(pi(x,
y), ∀x , σ(x, z))⊆ r(∼[∼pi(x, y), σ (x, z)]∀x). However, r(∀x,σ(x, z))⊆x r(pi(x, y))≡
r(∀x) ⊆x r(∼[∼pi(x, y), σ (x, z)]), consequently pi(x, y),∀x,σ(x, z) and ∼[∼pi(x, y),
σ (x, z)]∀x have both nil or non-nil reference simultaneously, according to the definition
of formula evaluation. Concerning the unbound variable parameters y and z, it is easy to
see that
r
(
pi(x, y),∀x,σ(x, z)) =y,z {(η, ζ ): (ξ, η, ζ ) ∈ [r(pi(x, y))∩ r(σ (x, z))]∪
r(∼σ(x, z)), r(∀x,σ(x, z))⊆x r(pi(x, y))
}
= {(η, ζ ): (ξ, η, ζ ) ∈ r(pi(x, y))∪ r(∼σ(x, z)),
r(∀x,σ(x, z))⊆x r(pi(x, y))
}
= {(η, ζ ): (ξ, η, ζ ) ∈ r(pi(x, y))∪ r(∼σ(x, z)),
r(∀x)⊆x r
(∼[∼pi(x, y), σ (x, z)])}
=y,z r
(∼[∼pi(x, y), σ (x, z)]∀x)
also holds according to the rules of formula evaluation that completes the proof. 2
3.2. iCTRL syntax and semantics
An intensional extension of conformal text representation can easily be realised
according to the principles summarised roughly in the previous section.
3.2.1. Syntax
The only modification of the syntax is based on (1). Let α denote an arbitrary formula
and x a contextual variable parameter, then
[α]x
denotes a context function that is also a formula. Additionally, ifw is an n-place contextual
conceptual relation parameter (including the logical constants of ∀ and ∃) andA is a context
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identifying index, i.e., singular conceptual relation parameter then, provided that at least
one of the xi variable parameters is a contextual one
wx1, . . . , xn and
A x
are also atomic formulae.
3.2.2. Semantics
The interpretation of the new syntactic elements introduced above is the following.
Beside U , the object domain, another domain for the contexts, W , should be postulated.
The extension of any n-ary contextual conceptual relation, w, index, A, and context
function of any formula, [α]x , can be given relative to them:
r(w x1 . . . xn)⊆ V n (V =U,W),
r(A x)⊆W,
r
([α]x)= {(ξ1, . . . , ξn, ξ): ξ ∈W,(ξ1, . . . , ξn) ∈ r(α)⊆ V n,
(ξ1, . . . , ξn)=wα(ξ), wα :W→ V n
}
(V =U,W).
The following additional properties of compound context function interpretation are
postulated:
r
([α,β]x)= r([α]x, [β]x),
r
(∼[α]x)= r([∼α]x).
The former equivalence expresses that context function scopes can be decomposed or
reduced, and vice versa, the latter one declares the principle of excluded middle expressible
as:
∼[α]x,∀x, [∼α]x.
[∼α]x,∀x,∼[α]x.
All other rules of formula evaluation remain unchanged with respect to ordinary text
representation.
Before proceeding and considering more complex applications, a simple illustrative
ordinary language example is discussed that probably makes the concepts introduced above
more easily understood.
Example 3.2. Let the sentence: “What is very useful is useful.”, be examined in view
of formula construction and its validity verified by using the resolution algorithm (see
Appendix A for details).
Having a brief look at this sentence, there is no doubt that the constituent “very useful”
should be considered as intensional, hence it is expressible as:
very y, [useful x]y.
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So as to understand better this formulation step it should be noticed above all that “useful x”
may certainly refer to a natural object while “very y” cannot. Instead of referring to a
natural object “very” modifies the meaning of “useful” like the following: if “useful x”
can be interpreted in some worlds, referred by [useful x]y , then these worlds can also be
referred to by “very y” so as to be able to refer those very worlds in which something is
really “very useful”. 8
The corresponding formula with the same content as the example sentence above
appears seemingly like{[useful x]y,∀y(very y, [useful x]y)}∀x.
It should be read as: for any natural object, referred to by x , and for any world (or context),
indexed by y , in which something, referred to by x , is very useful (in the sense given
above), those are also useful objects according to the same context. For testing validity its
negation should be proven to be unsatisfiable:{∼[useful x]y,∃y(very y, [useful x]y)}∃x.
Then the clause transforming process, that is just reduced now to the skolemisation stage
of the formula, results in the following clause set:(∼[useful x]y,A y)B x. very y,A y. ([useful x]y,A y)B x.,
which is obviously unsatisfiable, hence the original formula is valid.
4. Relation between the classical and text representational language of logic
4.1. CFOL and CTRL
One of the very first questions arising in this context is what kind of relation can be
verified between text representational and the classical first-order language, which is just
the next issue.
Proposition 4.1. Classical language of first-order logic is totally involved in the language
of text representation.
Proof. According to the well-known grammar and interpretation rules of first-order logical
language the following rewriting rule set can be proposed for mapping first-order expres-
sions to the corresponding text representational ones. 9 Name and predicate/conceptual
8 This way of reflection resembles a literary model very much. Sei Shonagon a lady-in-waiting of the Japanese
Imperial Court was especially fond of making records in her diary (Makura no soshi, 991–1000 A.D.) in a way
like listing her experiences explicitly under titles as: unpleasant situations, amusing situations, etc. (A. Waley,
The Pillow-Book of Sei Shonagon, London, 1928.)
9 Note that these rules operate on that type of propositional connectives, which are used to formalise logical
fine structure.
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relation symbols of classical logic and text representation, respectively, can be mapped to
each other as:
a↔A x;
y = f (x)↔ (F y)x;
p(x, . . .)↔ p′ x . . . .
For any open formulae, α and β , of classical logic, there are corresponding ones, α′ and
β ′, of text representation as shown below:
∼α↔∼α′;
α&β↔ α′, β ′;
α ⊃ β↔∼(∼β ′, α′).
Similarly, for any classical formulae, either for closed ones, α, or for open ones with respect
to the variable symbol x , α(x) and β(x), and for the corresponding formulae, α′, α′(x) and
β ′(x), of text representation the following rules are valid:
∼α↔∼α′;
α(x)(a/x)↔ α′(x),A x. (↔ α′(x),∀x.∀x,A x.);
∀x.α(x)↔ α′(x),∀x;
∃x.α(x)↔ α′(x),∃x.
It is also clear that if there is a common interpretation to a set of corresponding pairs
of closed classical first-order and text representational formulae, then their evaluation
processes result in the same truth values: their evaluation processes are equivalent to each
other. 2
The above argumentation encourages the belief that the inverse mapping also exists,
just as if the two languages of logic were truly equivalent, which statement however does
not hold. It is not very hard to find counter examples proving the contrary, justifying the
proposition that text representational language totally involves the language of classical
first-order logic. So as to show this, some everyday natural language sample sentences are
considered.
Example 4.1. Let the typical sentence scheme of predicate logic, “Any F is-G.”, be con-
sidered and formalised both in classical first-order logic and also in text representation.
Concerning classical first-order logic, this sentence has to be transformed first into an-
other one in a truth-value invariant manner, that is a generally accepted technique in any
process of formula construction, and which is verified to be correct just intuitively up to the
moment. Consider the subsequent transcripts: “If something is-F, then it is-G.”, “For any-
thing, if it is-F, then it is-G.” This latter paraphrase yields the following first-order formula:
∀x.f (x)⊃ g(x). For anything, if it is-F, then it is-G.
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Consequently, instead of the original natural language sentence one of its paraphrases was
formalised in the classical logical language with the implicit hypothesis that they are all
logically equivalent. On the other hand, both the original sample sentence and its para-
phrases can be represented by separate text representational formulae:
g x,∀x,f x.↔∀x.f (x)⊃ g(x). 10 Any F is-G.
f x,∃x.⊃ g y,∀y→ x. 11 If something is-F, then it is-G.
∼(∼g x,f x)∀x.↔∀x.f (x)⊃ g(x). For anything, if it is-F, then it is-G.
At this stage it is clear that ∀x.f (x)⊃ g(x) and ∼(∼g x,f x)∀x. formalise the same
sentence pattern (“For anything, if it is-F, then it is-G.”) in a synchronous way, i.e., both
of them have the same subject, ∀x , and the predicates are structured in the same way,
f (x)⊃ g(x) and ∼(∼g x,f x), respectively. At the same time truth-value invariant para-
phrasing can be made explicit and evident:
|∼(∼g x,f x)∀x.| = |g x,∀x,f x.|.
Actually, the natural language sentences “For anything, if it is-F, then it is-G.” and “Any F
is-G.”, are truth-value-equivalent.
A similar statement holds in the dual case for the series of sentences “Some F’s are G.”
One more example of everyday language points out again the flexibility of CTRL and
also the fidelity of CTRL formulae to natural language structures.
Example 4.2. Let the sentence “John walks.” (in Hungarian: “János sétál.”) be considered
and formalised immediately as:
walk(John)↔ walk x, John x. John walks.
If the original sentence subject were negated, “Nem János sétál.” (Not John walks.),
which can be interpreted approximately as “It is not John who walks.” (but someone
else), 12 then classical first-order language fails to formalise this aspect, while the
corresponding text representation formula can represent it literally as follows:
walk x,∃x,∼John x. It is not John who walks.
10 It should be pointed out that the open subformula ∼(∼g x,f x) stands exactly for f (x) ⊃ g(x). Actually,
text representation language does not even have any other device to express the content of the “if . . . , then . . .”
connective in this type of context (see argumentation in Section A.1.1).
11 According to the preceding definitions, the above example expresses the same content.
f x,∃x. ⊃ g y,∀y→ x.
can be rewritten as follows:
|f x,∃x. ⊃ g y,∀y→ x.| = |f x.∃x.⊃ g y,∀y,f x.| = |∼f x,∀x. ∨∼(∼g y,f y),∀y.|
= |∼(∼g y,f y,f y)∀y.| = |∼(∼g y,f y)∀y.| = |g y,∀y,f y.|,
which is just the expected result. Now it is proven formally that the sentences: “If something is-F, then it is-G.”
and “Any F is-G.”, have indeed the same truth values.
12 For an exhaustive description of this type of grammatical problem the reader is referred to [2].
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As a matter of fact this could be rephrased roughly by the next CFOL formula:
∃x[walk(x)&x 6= John]. It is not John who walks.
The meaning of the original sentence (Nem János sétál) is much broader, and “∼John x” is
possibly not the optimal equivalent matching the natural language expression “not John”,
but still referring to anybody except John covers more or less this meaning.
It should be noted that the subject is in focussed position in the Hungarian sentence
(Hungarian has a topic-comment type of phrase structure [2]), which is not perceptible
in English entirely expressing this by a preparatory subject construction. An obvious
problem arises at this point: what happens if the predicate were focussed on instead in
the sense that “Somebody walks, but it is not John.” Actually, the intended literal predicate
focussing is ungrammatical in Hungarian: “Sétál nem János.∗” (find accurate reasoning
in [2]), however, the literal translation of the English version exists: “Valaki sétál, de nem
János.” This sentence can be formalised in CTRL as:
walk x,∃x. ∼John y,∀y→ x. Somebody walks, but it is not John.
while the corresponding CFOL formula still remains the same as above, as it is unable to
distinguish them:
It is not John who walks.∃x[walk(x)&x 6= John]
Somebody walks, but it is not John.
The above examples show clearly after all that text representation language really
subsumes the language of classical first-order logic. The latter is a special case of the
former, which means that only those natural language sentences can be formalised in
classical first-order logic the generalised subjects of which are either one of the pure
quantifiers (or which can be rephrased in this manner) or an individual. Two types of
counter example were constructed demonstrating that CTRL is wider than the language of
first-order logic. Example 4.1 shows that a whole class of truth-value-equivalent formulae
can occasionally be ordered to a certain first-order formula; on the other hand Example 4.2
reminds that CTRL shorthand is not easy to be rephrased by the classical first-order
language. To summarise this the following position is taken on this issue.
Conclusion 4.1. CTRL and classical first-order language can be made technically
equivalent in the sense that those CTRL tools that have no direct mapping in classical
first-order language must be rephrased truth-value-invariantly within CTRL lacking those
tools, initiating an indirect translation of the formula that is concerned.
Beside numerous efficiencies the language of text representation still has some
deficiencies a typical instance of which is the next one.
r(high x,horse x)= r(horse x,high x)
is apparently valid, however, the corresponding formulae certainly cannot even have any
similar meaning, in fact, “horse high” kinds of constructions can hardly be interpreted as
a meaningful natural grammatical phrase at all. Thus, predicative relation cannot be taken
as commutative.
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Furthermore, there is an application area where CTRL technique of logical text mod-
elling seems to be absolutely inefficient. This is automated natural language translation.
The obvious reason for that is just the thoroughly represented sentence structure of CTRL
formalism that differs from language to language raising a similarly difficult translation
problem as the original case.
4.2. Relation between intensional CFOL and iCTRL
Ordinary conformal text representation alone seems to have many advantages over
classical first-order language of logic, outlined in Section 4.1 and earlier in [10–12].
Actually just ordinary CTRL itself leads out of the frames of CFOL. A similar behaviour
can be observed as intensional logic is concerned. It clarifies many details due to its special
qualities of descriptiveness that can be best appreciated by studying examples reminding
of the limits of the classical language of intensional logic [13].
A short illustrative analysis of classical modal calculi (that of S4 and the converse of
the Barcan formula) is taken next into focus. This is, however, by no means just technical
or limited to syntactic manipulations only. On the contrary, it helps to understand why
classical interpretation of S4 is inexact, and how a plainer reasoning for the validity of the
converse of the Barcan formula can be recognised making use of the expressive character
of iCTRL.
A classical resolution algorithm is chosen as a reasoning device [7], which is adapted
to text representational context (summarised in Appendix A). Other well-known and
prominent methods could evidently have been utilised or referred to, like, e.g., tableau
proof system [16], or the sequent based proof method of Jackson et al. [4] that is worked
out especially for modal predicate logic. 13 Actually, the one suggested here seems to be
simple and demonstrative enough, supplying clear and rational explanations to trace back.
4.2.1. Analysis of S4
Provided that the accessibility relation is transitive, according to Kripke-semantics, the
validity of the S4 axiom is implied:
Nα ⊃NNα. (2)
What seems rather problematic here is howNNα should be interpreted in (2) in spite of the
fact that traditionally it is believed to be correct as N(N(α)). Yet, the following analysis
of the relationship between the scheme Nα ⊃NNα and the transitivity condition is going
to show that the case is unlike what is generally expected.
In order to be able to decompose accurately the structure ofNNα, simple necessity,Nα,
should be examined first. According to Kripke-semanticsNα is true in an interpretation if
in any interpretation accessible from that one α is evaluated true. The text representation
syntax has the advantage that this definition can be formalised literally as follows: [α]x
represents the formula, α, with respect to an interpretation, x; [∀x]y refers to any
interpretation, x , accessible from an interpretation, y; hence, provided that “0 y” stands
13 Unfortunately, this method is proven to be incomplete due to the restrictive presupposition of seriality on the
accessibility relation.
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Table 1
Ways of expressing NNα
Classical first-order formula Text representation formula
N(N(α)) [[[α]x,∀x]y,∀y]w,0w. (i′)
N(N(α)) {[[α]x,∀x]y, [∀y]w}0w. (i′′)
N(N)(α)∗ [([α]x, [∀x]y)∀y]w,0w. (ii′)
N(N)(α)∗ {([α]x, [∀x]y)[∀y]w}0w. (ii′′)
(N(N))(α)∗∗ [[α]x([∀x]y,∀y)]w,0w. (iii′)
(N(N))(α)∗∗ {[α]x[[∀x]y,∀y]w}0w. (iii′′)
(N(N))(α)∗∗ {[α]x([∀x]y, [∀y]w)}0w. (iii′′′)
for the present interpretation, “[∀x]y,0 y” represents those ones which are accessible from
the present one; and finally “{[α]x, [∀x]y},0 y .” formalises the prescribed content, i.e., α
is true in any interpretation accessible from the one taken as the present interpretation.
Formalising double necessity is a bit more complicated. Table 1 summarises the
possible candidates for expressing this content. There are numerous formally feasible scope
patterns. Without intending to determine in advance which are the ones that suit intuitively
best the requirements, it should be noted that the intensional extension of CTRL leads out
of the frames limited by classical language of intensional logic; i.e., the latter is totally
involved in the language of intensional text representation.
It must be indicated clearly that neither the ∗ expressions, which are of course
ungrammatical yet no better notation appears to be able to paraphrase the corresponding
concept, nor the expressions marked by ∗∗ are acceptable relative to the traditional
interpretation of the problem.
To keep the discussion compact only the (ii) option is chosen for a detailed examination,
the other alternative, (iii), does not produce novelty any more. It should be pointed out that
options (i′) and (i′′) are obviously out of question, although, this embarrassing situation
can be resolved by postulating a more or less self-evident additional scheme:[([[α]x,∀x]y, [α]x)∀y]w,0w.
specifying that for any proposition that is asserted in a reduced context, indexed only by x ,
the same can be stated in a compound one, indexed by x and y respectively.
The validity of (2) relative to both conditions of transitivity (3)(([∀x]w, [[∀x]y]w)[∀y]w),∀w. (3′)(([∀x]w, [∀x]y)[∀y]w),∀w. (3′′)
requires to show that both of the formula sets composed by the variants ′ and ′′ are
unsatisfiable.[[α]x,∀x]w,0w. (4)
∼[([α]x[∀x]y)∀y]w,0w. (5′)
∼(([α]x, [∀x]y)[∀y]w)0w. (5′′)
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The transitivity conditions of (3) express the fact that for any world, referred by
“∀w”, the alternatives’ alternatives, referred either by “([[∀x]y]w, [∀y]w)∀w” or by
“([∀x]y, [∀y]w)∀w”, are also the alternatives of “∀w”, i.e., are included in “[∀x]w,∀w”.
Of course the ′ option is sufficient to study, the ′′ case can be treated similarly. The set
of formulae at issue regarding satisfiability is (3′,4,5′), which after routine operations of
clause decomposition is equivalent to the following:[[α]x]w, [∀x]w,0w. (6)(([[∼α]x]w, [[A x]y]w), [B y]w),0w. (7)(([∀x]w, [[∀x]y]w), [∀y]w),∀w. (8)
Then from (6) and (7) directly follows((∼[∀x]w, [[Ax]y]w), [By]w),0w., (9)
which with (8) makes contradiction immediately.((∼[[∀x]y]w, [[Ax]y]w), [B y]w),0w. (10)
This formula states that in spite of presuppositions the world index “{[[Ax]y]w, [By]w},
0w” cannot exist.
Conclusion 4.2. The previous example reminds that the S4 axiom, as it is traditionally
interpreted, cannot be proven simply by the assumption that the accessibility relation is
transitive, although a supplementary presupposition can restore this state. However, the
iCTRL reconstruction of the S4 axiom clears up the case by offering several additional
feasible interpretations some of which obey really to that principle that is classically
presupposed.
4.2.2. Analysis of the converse of the Barcan formula
The subsequent analysis demonstrates how efficiently iCTRL can be applied for
detecting validity conditions under which a certain (set of) formula(e), now the converse
of the Barcan formula can be verified. The converse of the Barcan formula expresses
commutativity of existential quantifier and the possibility relation in a certain direction:
∃x.M[α(x)] ⊃M[∃x.α(x)]. (11)
So as to find out these validity conditions the following pair of text representational
formulae should be considered instead obtainable simply by translating (11) literally:[([α(x)]y,∃y)∃x]w,0w. (12)
and
∼[[α(x),∃x]y,∃y]w,0w., (13)
which are analogously achievable like in the case of simple necessity in the previous
section. These are equivalent to the next clause set concerning satisfiability:[([α(x)]y,A y)B x]w,0w. (14){([[∼α(x)]y]w, [[∀x]y]w)[∀y]w}0w. (15)
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The most simple and obvious one of several possible answers to the problem posed here
can be reached by considerations appearing to be rather formal at first sight, mostly because
it can be resolved from the current scene immediately:{([[∀x]y]w, [∀x]w)[∀y]w}0w. (16′)
The encoded meaning can be recognised easily: (16′) expresses the fact that any accessible
alternatives of the present universe, “([[∀x]y]w, [∀y]w)0w”, should contain the universe
of the present world, “[∀x]w,0w”. 14 (16′) itself also declares a philosophical self-
evidence which in its present form rephrases an ontological interpretation of the principle
of self-identity, ∀x.x = x , asserting due to Coreth that “Seiendes ist, sofern es ist,
notwendig Seiendes” (existent is, provided that it really exists, necessarily existent), or
in other words: for everything that exists, if it really exists, the non-existence of that is
impossible, [1, p. 228], [18, no. 124].
As a verification of (16′), put (14) and (15) together concluding to{(∼[[∀x]y]w, [Bx]w)[Ay]w}0w.∨ {∼[∀y]w, [Ay]w}0w., (17)
which in the subsequent step with (16′) results in a contradiction.
Another commonly known solution suitable for the same purpose is the condition([[∀x]y,∀x, [α(x)]y]w, [∀y]w)0w. (16′′)
(that can be found in reference books, see, e.g., [14]) stating that any accessible universe
alternatives should contain the corresponding predicate extensions. This, even in its
interpreted form, seems also to be a rather formal prescription. The proof can be performed
analogously composing (17) with (16′′). It yields:{(∼[[α(x)]y]w, [B x]w)[A y]w}0w.∨ {∼[∀y]w, [A y]w}0w. (18)
Then (18) with (14) makes a contradiction.
Conclusion 4.3. There is a transparent ontological ground for the converse of the Barcan
formula, stating that any accessible alternatives of the present universe should contain the
present one, in other words, the accessible world alternatives can only be wider than the
present real one: even imagination cannot be independent from reality.
Conclusion 4.4. It is easy to prove that the ontological precondition, (16′), and the
conventional one (16′′), are equivalent:[[∀x]y,∀x,∀y]z,0 z.≡ [{[∀x]y,∀x, [α(x)]y}∀y]z,0 z. 15
14 Note that both “[[∀x]y]w” and “[∀x]w” refer to the normal object domain by the variable symbol x, “[∀y]w”
to the world of alternatives of the present world, 0, by y.
15 Observe that∼[[∀x]y]z/[[α(x)]y]z is a valid substitution for (16′′), where∼[[∀x]y]z stands for the universal
predicate associated with the current world alternative.
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Table 2
Logic schools and their representatives
Stoic school Peripatetic school
Parmenides (540–480)
Diodoros Chronos (?–307) Aristotle (384–322)
Zenon (336–264) Theophrastos (372–287)
Chrisippos (278–204)
Boethius (480–524) Boethius (480–524)
Avicenna (980–1034)
St Thomas Aquinas (1225?–1274)
Leibniz (1646–1716)
Frege (1848–1925)
4.3. Reasons of discrepancies between traditional logic and text representation—a
historical retrospection
It might be astonishing that a rather philosophical discussion finishes this section,
however, in order to make the gist of the presented ideas more perceptible and assist to
judge their significance more thoroughly, a draft evocation of the historical background
and making use of its perspective will be inevitable. On the other hand there is an apparent
reason for trying to get to conclusions this way: “According to an ancient methodological
principle there are no sciences that are able to determine their own subjects and methods.
. . . The stand-point from which the subject and method of a science can be described is
a position always outside that science but inside the domain of preliminary knowledge
preceding any scientific analysis.” 16
According to a stereotyped belief of logic, the triumphant of the two thousand year
contest fought by term logic (researched by Aristotle and his followers the Peripatetics)
with propositional logic (investigated by the representatives of the Stoic school) seems to
have been definitely the latter since the final decades of the last century. (See Table 2.) It
was due to above all Frege’s activity. Corresponding to historical researches of logic [8],
a syncretism came to be felt later within the compass of which even the Peripatetics
themselves acknowledged the superiority of propositional logic, too. It is also generally
agreed that the widely known development of modern symbolic logic could not have been
carried out on the grounds of term logic. The academic public belief proceeds further. It is
stated that the Peripatetic way of approach is supposed to have hindered the development of
logic until the day of Leibniz, the last committed representative of the Peripatetic school.
Moreover, personally he can be blamed for the fact that he was not able to surpass the
tradition and reach the aims he set for himself [6].
“The respect for the Aristotelian logic of subject and predicate had another
unfortunate effect on Leibniz’s thought, namely, that of making him try to explain
16 A. Anzenbacher, Einführung in die Philosophie, Herder, Wien, 1992.
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away propositions of a relational form. (. . .) . . . But there was a second reason,
unknown to Leibniz, why he could make little progress in the construction of an ideal
language, and that was his failure to shake himself free from the subject-predicate
dogma of traditional logic.”
The above deeply rooted convinced critique of the Peripatetics could be extended by
several similar others from literature, which is tinged only by some scattered attempts
of opposition. Maróth devotes his book [8] to prove by the recently accessible works
of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) that the dichotomy of the Peripatetic and Stoic propositional
logic is inappropriate. There existed a propositional logic of the Peripatetics, too, hitherto
unrecognised by researches, which occurred earlier than that of the Stoics and also survived
it at least by thousand years. Maróth in his book tries to reconstruct the whole system of
Peripatetic propositional logic, and he argues that its utmost appearance is not subordinate
to that of the Stoics at all, just on the contrary exceeds it in many respects.
Another contribution to this is Klima’s paper [5], which constructs a logical language
embedded into the first-order one for an analysis of the Middle Age logic, continuing
the Peripatetic school, from a modern aspect. His result is suitable to represent subject-
predicate structure, and without pointing it out explicitly, it is equivalent to the language
of classical first-order logic. This attempt, however, can only resolve the doctrine that
since the modern symbolic logic was developed strictly on the grounds of propositional
logic, which is no doubt a historical fact, therefore it is the only and necessary way as
well.
By an argumentation detailed earlier can be proven that for the determination of the
so-called fine logical structure the functional (subject-predicate) structure of a statement is
sufficient to be analysed, i.e., the fine logical structure can also be reconstructed on purely
Peripatetic grounds. In other words Peripatetic logic can also be generalised at least to
the level of classical first-order logic. Henceforth, the affair around Peripatetic and Stoic
logic just seems to be an aspect problem: the two thousand years old opposition was not
genuine, it was more or less a matter of education or habit.
The difference between the Peripatetic and Stoic attitude to logic then can be
summarised in the following. The common base for determining the fine logical structure of
statements, no matter if it is admitted either explicitly or just implicitly, is the analysis of the
functional structures of theirs, which means essentially the recognition of subordinate and
co-ordinate relations in action. The Stoic way of regarding, contrasted with the Peripatetic
one, does not seem to distinguish subordination from co-ordination, consequently, it is
compelled to map truth-value invariant the subordinate relations into co-ordinate ones. On
the other hand, the Peripatetic approach seems to have suffered from authentic treatment
of polyadic relations, which as a matter of course is not necessarily an insoluble problem,
even if it has appeared to be unsolved up to the present. Nevertheless, links between them
should also be reminded, for instance the Peripatetic attitude is smuggled back to modern
logic (of Stoic mind) via the theory of description.
If the two thousand year old opposition has already been described like coming to an
issue in favour of Stoic attitude, a series of questions arise at once the most obvious of
which is: what is the point of re-disturbing this problem?
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Any answer appears to be highly idiosyncratic at first sight. Everybody who has
got used to one of them will find that one the only intuitive and preferable way of
thinking. This argument should be highly appreciated, but it also has to be reminded
that natural language, that after all is always the starting-point to any logical analysis,
actually applies subordinate constructions. From this prospect a logical language that
is able to map both the subordinate and the co-ordinate relations of natural languages
invariantly may certainly be preferable. The logic of Stoics only seems to prove by
its existence that co-ordinate relation alone could be sufficient to be used for the
language of logic, which resembles the commonly known fact that, e.g., Sheffer’s one
is sufficient to express any other propositional function, not implying that the ones like
&, ∧, ∼, ⊃, . . . , which also have their natural language equivalents, should or may be
neglected.
Thus, there are several pragmatic reasons for the Peripatetic mind. One is its fidelity
of a higher degree enabling the practical performance of validation tests on formalised
texts. Another fact is that the Stoic school representative classical first-order language has
been proven to be totally included in the one of text representation that itself belongs to the
Peripatetic branch. Further reasons are comprehensible if intensional improvements are
also drawn into focus, namely to create a coherent and consistent syntax for the language
of intensional logic, which has been the primary range of interest of this paper.
5. Conclusions
A theoretically new and efficient, but not in the least unprecedented logical language was
introduced that gives promising and practical responses to some since long unanswered
questions of this domain. Natural language text modelling is a challenge to represent both
syntax and semantics. To represent semantics is a necessity, while representing syntax is
optional but might be beneficial. The validation problem of formal logical text models
against the corresponding natural language texts is one of its application domain that is
addressed and answered primarily by iCTRL. This point is essential in the knowledge
representation phase of AI systems when completeness and soundness of text–formula
translation are supposed to be verified. Besides, this area is highly interdisciplinary relating
to computational linguistics, logic, AI and other fields concluding to several additional
consequences.
iCTRL is a new, natural language syntax consistent, language of intensional logic
moreover it is also an effective logical type of knowledge representation technique. It
introduces a new dimension into logical text modelling. In contrast with the language
of traditional logic utilising co-ordination exclusively, subordination is also represented
implying more exact modelling of natural language utterances. Historically, it can be
believed as a backtracking to term logic of the Aristotelian line of tradition preceding
the Frege initiated present-day dominant approach. Similar to Frege’s graph language a
transparent graphical interpretation of the CTRL/iCTRL formalism is outlined that helps
to visualise and clarify the concepts introduced in the paper.
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Just as it follows conscientiously and strictly the most essential syntactic structures
of natural languages CTRL/iCTRL turns out to be closer to the common sense. The
proximity attribute of the new formalism relative to natural languages can be identified
that is essential in so far as knowledge representation validation problems of larger text
bases are concerned. An adaptation of resolution technique is summarised as a proof aid,
although, it is equally important as the backbone of AI system inference engines.
Conformal text representation and its intensional extension have been proven to be
proper supersets of classical first-order and intensional logic, respectively. As consistently
keeping to the subject-predicate type of textual knowledge representation CTRL/iCTRL
need not execute any preliminary truth-value-invariant transformation that is generally
accepted in the traditional method of formula construction. This very step cannot be proven
to be valid within the frames of CFOL exactly, just informally and intuitively, however, it
can be verified to be correct formally by CTRL methodology. iCTRL representation of
classical modal operators reveals some misinterpretation pitfalls that hitherto has avoided
notice, and that can be escaped.
The most significant consequence of the presented formal logical language in respect to
AI is that it offers an elegant knowledge representation frame, which realistically enables
automated knowledge acquisition: a computer-aided generation of textual knowledge
bases built from natural language texts that is fundamental for text based information
retrieval systems. Automated knowledge acquisition procedure is feasible in view
of the facts that CTRL/iCTRL is grounded on the grammatical structure of natural
languages, which, however, can be parsed automatically granted by issues of computational
linguistics. Regulation or legal texts are extremely favourable substances for this purpose
for several distinct reasons, however, any other traditional application fields of large text
based information retrieval systems as library catalogues, press archives or other type
of textual databases can also be a question of interest. Similarly to other knowledge
representation tools iCTRL presents just a framework supposing further research on
particular natural language models in case of any definite application.
Concerning theoretical outcomes, iCTRL can be treated as an alternative of the classical
intensional language of logic that can contribute to a better understanding of logic of nat-
ural language structures, additionally, it also provides a subject motivating new researches
of logic and computational linguistics. Further applications on philosophical logic area are
also conceivable owing to the homogeneous structure of the iCTRL formalism, e.g., explor-
ing background of logical paradoxes and their resolution possibilities. As logical language,
iCTRL is especially interesting from the perspective of logic history, since it refutes by its
existence centuries long scientific prejudices.
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Appendix A. Inference with text representational formulae
A.1. Inference with ordinary text representational formulae
The subsequent sections of Appendix A are devoted to show how to find the way back
to the resolution method, the probably best-known classical algorithm to test formula sets
for unsatisfiability. Definitions and proofs are going to be limited to the extent that cannot
be traced from the literature, most of the well-known details are to be omitted, however,
commonly known fundamental definitions are repeated in terms of text representation to
make comprehension easier.
A.1.1. Clause
The resolution method operates on a special kind of formulae, clauses, hence its idea
should be reconsidered, together with the algorithm converting arbitrary CTRL formulae
into clause format. It has to be pointed out that the classical clause concept is still accepted
as far as formulae of propositional logic are concerned, although some changes are needed
beyond this level, i.e., if the fine logical structure of proposition is also taken into account.
Definition A.1 (Literal). Positive (non-negated) or negative (negated) atomic conceptual
relations are called literals.
Definition A.2 (Skolem normal form). A CTRL formula is considered to be in Skolem
normal form, if it does not have any indefinite subject. Namely, it does not have any
subject that is existentially quantified either explicitly or implicitly, 17 i.e., all of its subjects
are either universally quantified (explicitly or implicitly), or singular atomic conceptual
relations (individual name or function).
A CTRL formula is in strict Skolem normal form if it is in Skolem normal form and all
of its subjects are pure universal quantifiers or singular atomic conceptual relations.
Definition A.3 (Clause). A CTRL formula in strict Skolem normal form is regarded
to be a clause if for the predicate parts, pi(x), of any of its (possibly nested) subject-
predicate decompositions, “pi(x),σ (x)”, one of the following conditions holds: pi(x) is
either one single open formula standing in the scope of any number of negation symbols
or a composite one set up by more than one open formulae compound by a predicative
relation which is within the scope of an odd number of negation symbols. However, the
corresponding subject part, σ(x), is in the scope of none or at most an even number of
negation symbols.
17 A subject with implicit existential quantifier means a ∀ type of one in the negative scope of a ∀ type of subject
or in the scope of a negation.
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Clauses of course need not necessarily be in strict Skolem normal form. The
contraposition rule can be applied to move any component of a clause predicate into subject
position and vice versa.
Proposition A.1. Any clause of text representational syntax is also a clause in the
conventional sense.
Verification is straightforward based on definition.
Example A.1. Discuss why the following formulae are not clauses:
[(a x y, b x)∀x]∀y.
(a x y,∀x)∃y. a x,∀x, (b x y,∀y).
As for the first one, its predicate part consists of two open formulae compound by a
predicative relation and it is within the scope of an even number of negation symbols.
Actually, it generates a pair of clauses: (a x y,∀x)∀y . and b x,∀x . The second one contains
an explicit existential quantifier, therefore it is not in Skolem normal form. Finally, the last
one has an implicit existential quantifier in its subject.
A rewriting rule set applicable recursively on the input CTRL formula that converts it
into a corresponding set of clauses is next at issue. Let the input formula be presumed that
its scopes of negation symbols have already been reduced to minimum. This operation can
also be applied later if necessary. Let pi(x) and σ(x) represent open formulae with respect
to the variable symbol x , let λ denote any literal, and let [. . .]il identify the ith stage of the
algorithm with l referring to the list of exactly those variable symbols, which have been
universally bound at some earlier stage j < i:
(1) Rewriting the positive scope of a definite subject:
(a) [pi(x),∀x]i−1
y
→[pi(x)]i(x,y),∀x
(b) [pi(x), (A x)z]i−1
y
→[pi(x)]iy, (A x)z
(2) Eliminating the negative scope of a universal quantifier:[
pi(x),∀x,σ(x)]i−1
y
→ [∼(∼pi(x),σ (x))∀x]i
y
(3) Eliminating the existential quantifier (Skolemization):[
pi(x),∃x,σ(x)]i−1
y
→ (∀x, (Ai x)y)∀y., { [pi(x)]iy, (Ai x)y[σ(x)]iy, (Ai x)y
(Ai x)y denotes the ith Skolem function symbol introduced at this stage. It must be new in
the sense that it cannot be one already occurring in any previous stages. [∀x, (Ai x)y]∀y .
is the explicit existence statement for the individual referred by (Ai x)y supplementing
the output of the conversion algorithm. The subject term, ∀y , of this formula, [. . .]∀y , is
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an abbreviation for the universal closure of [. . .] with respect to its free variable symbols,
which are all the members, yj , comprising the list y , i.e., (. . . (([. . .]∀y1)∀y2) . . .) for all
yj belonging to the index list y .
(4) Rewriting positive and negative open formulae (in a predicate part):
(a) [pi(x),σ (x)]i−1
y
→
{ [pi(x)]iy
[σ(x)]iy
(b) [∼(pi(x), σ (x))]i−1
y
→∼(∼[∼pi(x)]iy,∼[∼σ(x)]iy)
(5) Rewriting literals:
[λ]→ λ
For clauses made up of ground propositions alone the classical notation and transforma-
tion algorithm of propositional logic is preferable.
Proposition A.2. The output of the above recursive algorithm is really a clause set.
Proof. Rules (1)–(3) ensure that the output is of strict Skolem normal form. Rule (4)
guarantees that the subject-predicate decomposition of any input formula have either one
single open formula or a set of open formulae compound by predicative relation in the
scope of an odd number of negation symbols as its predicate part. Rule (5) stops the
algorithm. 2
Proposition A.3. The original formula and the associated set of clauses are equivalent
with respect to satisfiability.
Proof. Rules (1), (4b) and (5) do not make any change on the reference of the input
formula.
Rule (2): (within the first-order equivalent sublanguage of text representation) both sides
are nil-referenced or non-nil-referenced simultaneously, see the contraposition rule.
Rule (3): it is sufficient to see that if r[pi(x),∃x,σ(x)] 6= nil then a suitable reference set
r ∈ r(∃x) can be chosen such that r := r[(A x)y] would hold, and vice versa. y is the list
of variable symbols occurring in the universal quantifiers holding pi(x),∃x,σ(x) in their
positive scopes.
Rule (4a): the existence of r[pi(x),σ (x)] implies the existence of both r[pi(x)] and
r[σ(x)], containing the reference of the corresponding subject simultaneously.
Finally, as far as the term “clause” is concerned, it is easy to see (cf. Section 4) that any
clause of the text representational syntax within the first-order equivalent sublanguage of
CTRL can be mapped to the corresponding clause of classical first-order logic, and vice
versa. 2
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Before proceeding, an example may help to clarify the old ideas newly expressed and to
illustrate how the above rule set works.
Example A.2. Let the formula “(b x y,∀y,o x y, d y)∀x(o x z,∀z, d z)f x .” be
transformed into clause form. The sequence of formulae below follows exactly the above
algorithm, figures in brackets identify the rules applied consecutively:[
(b x y,∀y,o x y, d y)∀x(o x z,∀z, d z)f x]1
( )
.[∼(∼(b x y,∀y,o x y, d y)(o x z,∀z, d z)f x)∀x]2
( )
. (2)[∼(∼(b x y,∀y,o x y, d y)(o x z,∀z, d z)f x)]3
(x)
∀x. (1a)
∼(∼[∼∼(b x y,∀y,o x y, d y)]4
(x)
∼[∼(o x z,∀z, d z)]4
(x)
∼[∼f x]4(x)
)∀x. (4b)
∼(∼[b x y,∀y,o x y, d y]4
(x)
∼[∼o x z,∀z, d z]4
(x)
∼(∼f x))∀x. (5)
∼
(
∼[∼(∼b x y,o x y, d y)∀y]5
(x)
(∼[∼o x z]5(x)∼[d z]5(x)
 (A z)x
)
f x
)
∀x. (2,3)
∼
(
∼
([∼(∼b x y,o x y, d y)]6
(x)
∀y
)({
o x z
∼d z
}
(A z)x
)
f x
)
∀x. (1a,5)
∼
(
∼
(
∼(∼[∼∼b x y]7(x),∼[∼o x y]7(x),∼[∼d y]7(x))∀y)({
o x z
∼d z
}
(A z)x
)
f x
)
∀x. (4b)
∼
(
∼
(
∼(∼b x y,o x y, d y)∀y
)({
o x z
∼d z
}
(A z)x
)
f x
)
∀x. (5)
Finally, the converse of rule (2) can eliminate double negations and the result is the
following pair of clauses:
(b x y,∀y,o x y, d y)∀x(o x z, (A z)x)f x.
(b x y,∀y,o x y, d y)∀x(∼d z, (A z)x)f x.
It may be a point of interest to have a brief look at these results and compare them to the
corresponding classical clauses generated by the formula “∀x{[(∀z.d z ⊃ o x z)&f x] ⊃
[∀y.(o x y&d y)⊃ b x y]}”:
b x y ∨∼o x y ∨∼d y ∨∼o x a(x) ∨∼f x
b x y ∨∼o x y ∨∼d y ∨∼d a(x) ∨∼f x
Comparing them it is remarkable that the latter one is a standardised statement with
an exaggerated size of the compound predicate part, namely the alternations of literals,
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and with very poorly visible subjects, which are the Skolem functions and the unmarked
universal quantifiers.
A.1.2. The resolution method
The problem that is to be faced next is how to adapt the well-known inference method
and the associated concepts of substitution and unification.
Definition A.4 (Substitution rule). A formula “σ ∗(x), τ(x)” is taken to be a substitution
with respect to the clause “pi(x), σ(x)”, provided that σ(x)= ∀x , σ ∗(x), with the result of
“pi(x), τ(x)”.
Proposition A.4 (Correctness of substitution rule). The substitution rule represents a
correct inference scheme.
Proof. Considering that r[τ(x)] ⊆x r[σ ∗(x)] and r[∀x,σ ∗(x)] ⊆x r[pi(x)] are true,
r[τ(x)] ⊆x r[pi(x)] is straightforward. 2
Example A.3. The result of the substitution “b x,A x .” applied to “a x,∀x,b x .” is
“a x,A x .”
The following rephrasing of the basic resolution rule concerns only non-propositional
clauses. Certainly, traditional resolution rule is still applicable for pure propositional
purposes. The subsequent formal interpretation of basic rule of resolution seems rather
complicated at first sight, however, its essence can be summarised in a quite illustrative
way. Providing the predicate parts of the input clause pair are complementary, and their
subject parts can be made common by a series of basic subject substitutions (i.e., the
analogue of unification step) obeying the succeeding definition, then the case would
conclude to a direct contradiction. So that it could be avoided, the negation of the unifying
basic substitution set should be presumed that is the condition of preventing that potential
contradiction. This direct consequence of the input clause pair is taken as their resolvent.
Definition A.5 (Basic resolution rule). The resolvent θ for an input clause pair pi and ρ is
determined recursively as follows.
Let the output of the ith step of resolution algorithm be
{[pii(xi), σi(xi)][ρi(yi), τi(yi)]}αi.
αi denotes that segment of the subject that has already been unified, and θi the condition
yielding this result. In the case of initial input it is (pi1, ρ1)α1., α1 = θ1 := ε, ε denotes the
empty formula and pi1 = pi , ρ1 = ρ.
Let the variable parameters of the innermost predicate parts of pii and ρi be unified:
denoted by the same symbols, while the rest of the variables are standardised apart (denoted
by symbols different from the ones unified earlier). Let L denote the common variable
symbol list of the ith input clauses. Thus, L identifies by its variable symbol elements
those subjects, which are to be unified.
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Two main alternatives can be distinguished: either both subjects are bound by the
corresponding innermost predicate part or at least one or possibly both of them is/are bound
by a separate one. Additional alternatives get into the picture according to the subject types
that are to be unified: none, one or both of the subjects may be either universally quantified
or singular. These points yield the following rule set.
(1) Subject unification: if xi, yi ∈L (that means xi = yi according to the presumption)
and
(a) singular-singular subject unification: if σi(xi) = τi(xi) = (A xi) . . . , then ac-
cording to the convention that αi+1 is compound as αi+1 = {[(. . .)α′i+1]α′′i+1}αi
and similarly θi+1 = {[(. . .)θ ′i+1]θ ′′i+1}θi the next input is (pii, ρi)αi+1, α′i+1 =
τi(xi), α
′′
i+1 = θ ′i+1 = θ ′′i+1 = ε, ηi+1 = (. . .)α′i+1; or
(b) universal-universal/universal-singular subject unification: if σi(xi)= ∀xi ,
σ ∗i (xi) and if
(i) τi(xi)= ∀xi , τ ∗i (xi), then τ ∗∗i (xi)= ∃xi , τ ∗i (xi) or
(ii) τi(xi)= (Axi) . . . , then τ ∗∗i (xi)= τi(xi),
then the next input is (pii, ρi)αi+1, α′i+1 = τ ∗∗i (xi), α′′i+1 = ε, θ ′i+1 = σ ∗i (xi),
θ ′′i+1 = τ ∗∗i (xi), ηi+1 = ε.
(2) Subject omission: if not (i.e., xi /∈ L or yi /∈L or xi, yi /∈L) and
(a) single subject omission: if, for example, xi /∈ L but yi ∈ L, then the next input
is {pii, [ρi(yi), τi(yi)]}αi+1, α′i+1 = σi(xi),α′′i+1 = θ ′i+1 = θ ′′i+1 = ε, ηi+1 =
(. . .)α′i+1; or
(b) double subject omission: if xi, yi /∈ L, then the next input is (pii, ρi)αi+1, α′i+1 =
σi(xi), α
′′
i+1 = τi(yi), θ ′i+1 = θ ′′i+1 = ε, ηi+1 = ((. . .)α′i+1)α′′i+1.
(3) otherwise the resolvent does not exist.
If the nth output (pin,ρn)αn, reaches the state that pin and ρn are complementary,
pin =∼ρn, then the resolvent for the initial input clause pair pi and ρ is θ = (∼θn)η, η =
(((. . .)ηn) . . .)η1, otherwise the resolvent does not exist.
The subsequent proposition characterises the relation between CTRL and conventional
resolution rule.
Theorem A.5 (Isomorphism). The text representational rule of resolution and the tradi-
tional one are isomorphic.
Proof. The CTRL resolvent is a clause, since the subjects of the resolvent are either
singular conceptual relations or existentially quantified predicative relations of literals, and
the negation of a formula of this form just satisfies the criteria of being a clause.
The following bijective mappings can be defined between text representational and
classical first-order terms, literals and clauses, respectively (they are similar to the ones
introduced in Section 4).
Terms:
a↔A x;
y = f (x, . . .)↔ (F y)x . . . ;
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Literals, conjunctive and disjunctive subformulae built up by literals:
λ↔ λ′; (p(x, . . .)↔ p′x . . . );
&
i
λi↔ ,
i
λ′i;∨
i
λi↔∼,
i
∼λ′i .
Clauses or closed disjunctive formulae:
∀x.β(x)⊃ α(x)↔ α′(x),∀x,β ′(x);
[∀x.α(x)](a/x)↔ α′(x),A x,
where α and β are a disjunctive and conjunctive subformulae, respectively.
It is clear at this stage that the two different clause types, i.e., the domains of operation,
can one-to-one be mapped to each other. It will be shown that this mapping can be extended
to the basic resolution rule, too.
(1) If xi, yi ∈L (i.e., xi = yi ) then
(a) if [∀xi.pii(xi)]a(. . .)/xi↔ pi ′i (xi), (A xi) . . . and
[∀xi.ρi(xi)]a(. . .)/xi↔ ρ′i (xi), (A xi) . . .
then [(. . .)ε]θi↔[(. . .)ε′]θ ′i ;
(b) if ∀xi[σ ∗i (xi)⊃ pii(xi)]↔ pi ′i (xi),∀xi, σ ′∗i (xi) and if
(i) ∀xi[τ ∗i (xi)⊃ ρi(xi)] ↔ ρ′i (xi), ∀xi , τ ′∗i (xi), then
[(. . .)ε]θi↔
{[
(. . .)σ ′∗i (xi)
]∃xi, τ ′∗i (xi)}θ ′i ,
(ii) [∀xi.ρi(xi)]a(. . .)/xi↔ ρ′i (xi), (A xi) . . ., then
[(. . .)a(. . .)/xi]θi↔
{[
(. . .)σ
′∗
i (xi)
]
(A xi) . . .
}
θ ′i .
(2) If xi or yi /∈ L then [(. . .)ε]θi↔[(. . .)ε′]θ ′i .
The rest of the proof will confirm that the outcome of the preceding algorithm, the
resolvents, can also be mapped one-to-one to each other, i.e., θ = θn↔ θ ′ = θ ′n. This can
be proven by the following argumentation. θ can be verified to be a most general unifier for
pin and ∼ρn, and (∼θ ′)η will be shown that it can be rewritten to the traditional resolvent
of the input clause pair that can be achieved by applying θ .
θ is a most general unifier for pin and∼ρn, since it is a special kind of mesh substitution
(see [7]), namely, which is a permutation of an ordinary one. In order to obtain that unifier
the standard mesh substitution algorithm should be applied on {pin,∼ρn} except that the
normal sequential access to the members of the parameter lists is altered according to the
order, which is given by the corresponding CTRL clauses in their order of subject bindings.
For this case the well-known unification theorem holds without any further restriction.
So as to rewrite (∼θ ′)η to a classical formula the subsequent procedure can be followed:
(1) Move negation symbol inward to the minimum scope:
(a) ∼∼α′ → α′;
(b) ∼[α′(x),∃x,β ′(x)]→∼α′(x),∀x,β ′(x);
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(c) ∼[α′(x),β ′(x)],∀x,γ ′(x)→∼α′(x),∀x,β ′(x), γ ′(x);
∼[α′(x),β ′(x)],∀x,γ ′(x)→∼β ′(x),∀x,α′(x), γ ′(x);
(d) ∼[α′(x), (A x) . . .]→∼α′(x), (A x) . . . ;
(2) Rewrite the resulting formulae into a classical one:
(a) α′(x),∀x,β ′(x)→∀x[β(x)⊃ α(x)];
(b) α′(x), (A x) . . .→ α[a(. . .)];
(c) α′(x),β ′(x)→ α(x)&β(x);
(3) Rewrite the result into classical clause format by using rules of classical proposi-
tional calculus.
The correctness of the above rule set is straightforward based on earlier issues presented
in Section 4.
At this point the only remaining task is to show whether the output of this procedure is
the same clause as the one normally achievable. To perform this it is sufficient to see that
both types of clause are made up by literals mutually corresponding to each other, and that
they also have mutually corresponding structures.
Evidently, the CTRL resolvent cannot contain other than exactly those literals which can
be mapped on the ones consisting of the corresponding normal resolvent, therefore, it is
satisfactory to show that the input literals preserve their “signs” in the output. According
to the resolution algorithm only (1b) has any effect on the resolvent structure. Hence, one
of the input clause subjects should remain in subject position while the other gets into
predicative status, but ultimately into the scope of a negation symbol, which means that
its “sign” is still preserved. Consequently, the CTRL rule of resolution keeps the “sign” of
the output literals unvaried, and since the resolvent itself is a clause, their final structure
corresponding to the classical one is assured, too. 2
Example A.4. Find a resolvent of (p x y,∀x,q x)A y . and [∼p x y, (A x)y]∀y .
Having noticed that the input clauses have complementary predicates, rule (1b)(ii) can
be applied first that yields: {(p x y,∀x,q x)[∼p x y, (A x)y]}A y . with the substitution
((. . .)∀y),A y . Then the same scheme is repeated once more producing [(p x y,
∼p x y)(A x)y]A y . while the valid substitution is {[q x, (A x)y]∀y}A y . As the output
includes a predicative relation of complementary conceptual relations as its predicate part
the resolvent clause is the negation of the last substitution: ∼{[q x, (A x)y]∀y}A y. ≡
[∼q x, (A x)y]A y.∨∼∀y,A y .
The corresponding traditional resolution process performed on traditional clauses
∼q x ∨ p x a and ∼p a(y)y yields the same result: ∼q a(a).
Other rules utilising contraposition scheme may complete this single one of basic
resolution so that it could be applied in any context.
The existence of one particular clause, the empty clause, is implied by resolution. This
concept belongs to the level of propositional logic so it is sufficient to refer to the original
definition.
Definition A.6 (Empty clause). The empty clause is the empty proposition (the alternation
having no arguments), except it is taken unsatisfiable.
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Generally an additional elementary rule of inference, factoring [7], is considered
separately.
Definition A.7 (Factor). Let pi,σ. = (. . . (pi,σ1) . . .σn). be a clause with the literals λ1
and λ2 occurring in pi or σi, i = 1,2, . . . , n. Then the result of applying a set of basic
substitutions of the type: “∀x,∀x→ xi .” or “∀x,A x .” making λ1 and λ2 identical in the
same (either predicate or subject) position is a factor of the clause pi,σ .
Example A.5. Find factors of (p x y,∀x,∼p x x)∀y,∼p y y .
Let the input first transformed to “[∼(∼p x y,∼p x x,∼p y y)∀x]∀y .” by
contraposition rule then the substitution “∀y,∀y → x .” be applied. The result is
“p x x,∀x .”. In a similar manner “p y y,∀y .” can also be obtained, but clearly, it is just a
variant of the former one.
Definition A.8 (Resolution algorithm). Resolution refutation is the iterative application of
the basic resolution- and factoring rules to a given input set of clauses, that is continuously
extended by the resolvents and factors, until the empty clause is reached.
From this point on it is sufficient to refer the reader to the literature with respect to
fundamental properties of resolution, e.g., soundness- and completeness proofs.
The following example will demonstrate how the discussed version of the traditional
resolution method works on an easy case of natural language inference.
Example A.6. Prove the subsequent instance of reasoning to be valid:
Horses are animals.
Horse heads are heads of animals.
Formalising the premise seems more or less evident with the comment that obviously
“horses” should be taken as “any horses” in this context. Nevertheless, the conclusion part
is worth some additional considerations. “Horse heads”, i.e., “heads of a horses”, that can
be made more explicit by the expression “head owned by a horse”, can be formalised here
as “(own x y,∃x,horse x)head y”, just to keep variants of genitive case as standardised as
possible. Thus the sentences above can be reproduced as follows.
animal x,∀x,horse x.
[(own x y,∃x,animal x)head y]∀y
(own z y,∃z,horse z)head y.
∀x.horse x ⊃ animal x
∀y{[∃z(own z y& horse z)& head y ⊃]
⊃ [∃x(own x y& animal x)& head y]}
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The conventional resolution refutation procedure can be performed after negating the
conclusion and transforming the resulting formula set into clause form:
animal x,∀x,horse x. animal x ∨∼horse x
(∼own x y,∀x,animal x)Ay.∨ ∼own x a ∨∼animal x ∨∼head a
∼head y,A y.
(own z y,B z)A y. own b a
horse z,B z. horse b
head y,A y. head a
Applying the basic resolution rule to “(∼own x y,∀x,animal x)A y.∨ head y,A y .” and
“(own x y,B x)A y .”, the following resolvent clause can be achieved:
∼animal x,B x. ∨∼head y,A y. ∼animal b ∨∼head a
Then resolving this conclusion by “head y,A y .”, and after that the output by “animal x,
∀x,horse x .” the result is
∼horse x,B x. ∼horse b
Finally, it concludes to the empty clause, nil, with “horse x,B x .” that is a member of the
input clause set coming to a contradiction.
A.2. Inference with intensional text representational formulae
Intensional extension makes no relevant difference from the inference method outlined
previously. The only difference appearing in the resolution algorithm applied to iCTRL
formulae compared with the one of non-intensional case discussed above occurs in the
formula-clause conversion algorithm.
Context functions can be decomposed into their elementary parts (and can also be
reunited, if needed), that allows to extend the definition of literal as follows: the context
function of any literal also remains a literal implying the invariance of any subsequent
steps.
The formula–clause conversion algorithm presented in Section 1.1 should be supple-
mented by the following rule (α represents a formula and x a context variable symbol):
(6) Moving context variable outward:[[α]x]i−1
y
→ [[α]iy]x.
The validity of this rule is straightforward. The resolution algorithm still remains
applicable in its previous form without any change.
Example A.7. Prove the following Aristotelian syllogism to be valid.([[a x]y,∀x,b x]z, [∀y]z)0 z
[b x,∀x, c x]y,0y.([[a x]y,∀x, c x]z, [∀y]z)0 z.
∀x.b(x)⊃Na(x)
∀x.c(x)⊃ b(x)
∀x.c(x)⊃Na(x).
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Conventional resolution refutation procedure is carried out after negating the conclusion
and performing the formula–clause conversion.([[a x]y,∀x,b x]z, [∀y]z)0 z.
[b x,∀x, c x]y,0y.(([∼[a x]y]z, [A x]z)[B y]z)0 z.([c x]z, [A x]z)0 z.
Now, resolving (([[a x]y]z, [∀x]z, [b x]z)[∀y]z)0 z. with (([∼[a x]y]z, [A x]z)[B y]z)0 z.
yields:(∼[b x]z, [A x]z)0 z.
Next is the resolution of the previous result with ([b x]y, [∀x]y, [c x]y)0y. which con-
cludes to(∼[c x]y, [A x]y)0y.
Finally this and ([c x]y, [A x]y)0y . resolve to nil, that is a contradiction.
References
[1] E. Coreth, Metaphysik, Eine metodisch-systematische Grundlegung, Innsbruck, 1964.
[2] É.K. Kiss, Configurationality in Hungarian, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1987.
[3] J. Groenendijk, M. Stokhof, Dynamic predicate logic, towards a compositional and non-representational
discourse theory, Manuscript, 1987.
[4] P. Jackson, H. Reichgelt, A general proof method for modal predicate logic, in: P. Jackson, H. Reichgelt,
F. van Harmelen (Eds.), Logic Based Knowledge Representation, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989,
pp. 177–228.
[5] G. Klima, Modernorum logica modernorum, Tertium non Datur 3 (1986) 177–197.
[6] W. Kneale, M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962.
[7] D.W. Loveland, Automated Theorem Proving: A Logical Basis, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1978.
[8] M. Maróth, Aristotelésto˝l Avicennáig (From Aristotle to Avicenna), Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1983.
[9] D. Pais, Két fejezet a mondattanból (Two sections from syntax), A Magyar Nyelvtudományi Társaság
Kiadványai, No. 79, Magyar Nyelvtudományi Társaság, Budapest, 1950.
[10] G. Rédey, Text representation, in: I. Fekete, P. Koch (Eds.), Proc. 2nd Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
Budapest, 1991, pp. 211–219.
[11] G. Rédey, Szöveges tudás automatikus kezelése (Automatic processing of textual knowledge), Ph.D. Thesis,
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 1992.
[12] G. Rédey, Conformal text representation, Engineering Appl. AI 6 (1993) 65–71.
[13] G. Rédey, Ordinary and intensional conformal text representation, in: K. Zreik (Ed.), Proc. Internat.
Workshop on Philosophy of Design and Information Technology, Chateau du Baffy, 1994, pp. 109–122.
[14] I. Ruzsa, Klasszikus, Modális és Intenzionális Logika (Classical Modal and Intensional Logic), Akadémiai
Kiadó, Budapest, 1984.
[15] I. Ruzsa, Modal Logic with Descriptions, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1981.
[16] R. Smullyan, First-Order Logic, Springer, Berlin, 1968.
[17] R.C. Stalnaker, R.H. Thomason, Abstraction in first-order modal logic, Theoria 3 (1968) 203–207.
[18] B. Weissmahr, Ontologie, Grundkurs Philosophie 3 (2. durchgesehene Auflage), Verlag W. Kohlhammer,
Stuttgart, 1991.
